California Western Law Review
Volume 48

Number 1

Article 3

2011

Shortcuts to Deliberation? How Cues Reshape the Role of
Information in Direct Democracy Voting
Michael Binder
University of North Florida

Cheryl Boudreau
University of California, Davis

Thad Kousser
University of California, San Diego

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr

Recommended Citation
Binder, Michael; Boudreau, Cheryl; and Kousser, Thad (2011) "Shortcuts to Deliberation? How Cues
Reshape the Role of Information in Direct Democracy Voting," California Western Law Review: Vol. 48 : No.
1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol48/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu.

Binder et al.: Shortcuts to Deliberation? How Cues Reshape the Role of Informati

SHORTCUTS TO DELIBERATION? How CUES RESHAPE

THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY
VOTING
MICHAEL BINDER, CHERYL BOUDREAU, AND THAD KOUSSER*

I. INTRODUCTION
The complex concept of "deliberation" has been defined
differently by legal scholars, political theorists, and analysts of
political behavior. Each field highlights a different aspect of
deliberation, making a positive or normative argument about how it
does or should occur. However, one thing that these diverse
definitions have in common is none seem to describe what occurs
when American voters enter the ballot box to play their leading role in
direct democracy.
Disconnects between the deliberative democracy ideal and
practice of voting on initiatives are numerous and varied. Legal
scholar Bruce Ackerman and political scientist James S. Fishkin
describe their model of a deliberative democracy as one in which
"Americans will not be encountering each other as consumers or
coreligionists or even as friends-but as citizens searching for
common ground ... in a common enterprise."' Polling evidence of
religious block voting on same-sex marriage initiatives such as
California's 2008 Proposition 8,2 as well as evidence of racial and

* Michael Binder is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political
Science and Public Administration, University of North Florida. Cheryl Boudreau is
an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of
California, Davis. Thad Kousser is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Political Science, University of California, San Diego. We thank Natalie Johnson for
her excellent research assistance.
1. Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day, in DEBATING
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 7, 22 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003).
2. See PATRICK J. EGAN & KENNETH SHERRILL, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK
FORCE POLICY INST., CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 8: WHAT HAPPENED, AND WHAT
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ethnic polarization on Proposition 1873 and Proposition 209,4 clearly
shows voters do not always see direct democracy as a common
enterprise.
Political theorist Joshua Cohen notes deliberation must occur in
settings in which participants "regard one another as formally and
substantively equal. .. . [T]hey aim to defend and criticize institutions

and programs in terms of considerations that others, as free and equal,
have reason to accept"5 and participants "are prepared to cooperate in
accordance with the results of such discussion." 6 While initiative
voters certainly may regard each other as equals, they have few
chances to make arguments in forms that would be generally accepted
by their peers. At the elite level, a salient feature of direct democracy
campaigns is that they nearly always lack the public debates between
supporters and opponents that characterize most races between
candidates. Instead of being forced to make broadly appealing
arguments and to refute the other side, initiative campaigns engage in
the one-way communication of television advertisements and the
individually-targeted medium of direct mail. When an initiative
campaign is over, opponents frequently (and often successfully) file
suit to have propositions overturned rather than cooperating with the
outcome. 7

3 (2009), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org
/downloads/reports/reports/piprop8_1l6_09.pdf.
3. See THE FIELD INST., A SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VOTING IN THE 1994
available at . http://field.com/fieldpollonline/
GENERAL ELECTION 5 (1995),
subscribers/COI-94-95-Jan-Election.pdf (analysis of voter preferences on a 1994
measure regulating illegal immigration).
4. See generally Bruce Cain & Karin MacDonald, Race and Party Politics in
the 1996 U.S. Presidential Election, in 2 RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN
CALIFORNIA 199 (Michael Preston et al. eds., 1998) (analyzing race and party effects
on Proposition 209, a 1996 ban on affirmative action).
5. Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185,
194 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
6. JOSHUA COHEN, Procedureand Substance in DeliberativeDemocracy, in
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY: SELECTED ESSAYS 154, 181 (2009).
7. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 106-07
(2009).
DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
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Deliberative democracy places "a large set of arguments .. on
the table," according to comparative political scientist Jurg Steiner.8
"The individual arguments are justified in a rational, logical and
elaborate manner. All participants are truthful in presenting their
arguments and the supporting information." 9 By contrast, students of
direct democracy have long worried that voters lack access to enough
arguments and sufficient information to vote competently.' 0 Analysis
of California's insurance proposition battles," and simply a glance at
journalistic "adwatch" coverage of the veracity (or lack thereof) of
recent proposition ads, shows that direct democracy campaigns are not
always truthful.
Of course, scholarship on deliberative democracy often points out
the disconnect between the deliberation model and political decisionmaking common practice. For example, Steiner notes "the ideal type
of deliberation . .. virtually never appears in pure form in real

politics."' 2 Jilrgen Habermas, the most influential deliberative
democracy scholar, also notes deliberative situations "have an
improbable character and are like islands in the ocean of everyday
praxis."l 3
Our aim in this Article is to provide a map to the terrain of direct
democracy voting, to look for islands of deliberation, and finally to
ask whether "cues"-the informational shortcuts provided by the
statements of recognized individuals or organizations-serve as
bridges to these islands. To do so, we review two literatures in
political science: observational works that use surveys or the analysis
of election results to study how voters react to the cues issued in real
8. Jurg Steiner, Potential for Deliberation Among EU Citizens 5 (May 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of North Carolina).
9. Id. at 5-6.
10. See Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New
Approaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REv. POL. Sa. 463, 467-70 (2004), for a
summary of this literature.
11. Insurance companies attempted to hide their support for ballot measures, a
ruse that was influential upon and detrimental to interests of misled voters. Arthur
Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in
CaliforniaInsurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 63-76 (1994).
12. Steiner, supra note 8, at 6.
13.

JGRGEN HABERMAS,

DIE EINBEZIEHUNG DES ANDEREN:

STUDIEN ZUR

POLITISCHEN THEORIE 323 (1996).
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direct democracy elections, and experimental works that simulate cues
and gauge their effects in controlled environments.
In both literatures, we look for answers to a single set of
questions: What sorts of informational shortcuts do voters regularly
rely upon? Whom do they believe and trust? Which cues are most
powerful? How does the behavior of voters who rely upon cues
compare to the behavior of voters who lack them?
We then apply these findings to a brief analysis of direct
democracy reforms that have been proposed or recently enacted in
California and other western states. Would these reforms change the
nature of the cues that voters receive? If so, how might they change
voter behavior?
Finally, we conclude by raising the question of whether cues
move the practice of voting in initiative elections closer to or farther
from the ideal of deliberative democracy. After evaluating the oftendiscouraging role of cues in deliberation, we highlight the broader
question of whether deliberation necessarily improves the quality of
democracy. Mathew D. McCubbins and Daniel B. Rodriguez note
[d]eliberation is proposed as a major palliative and, for some, even
a panacea for nearly all that is wrong in society - a procedural
'cure-all' for self-interested decisionmaking, for an uniformed
citizenry, for the oppression of minorities, for social fragmentation,
and for low levels of confidence in our government, among other
ills. 14

Yet these and other authors are skeptical that deliberation fulfills all of
those goals, and some empirical evidence points to potential negative
effects of deliberation. Rather than resolving this major debate, our
more limited goal here is to chart the shortcuts voters take in direct
democracy elections and evaluate whether this brings them closer to
or farther from the complicated, contested ideal of deliberation.

14. Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating
Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 10-11 (2006) (citations
omitted).
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II. FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY AND ELECTION RETURN LITERATURES
In searching for the bridges to the islands of deliberation,
empirical assessments of the role of cues have focused on
recognizable organizations, political leaders, and parties as signals that
voters use to navigate the murky waters of direct democracy. Using a
broad national perspective, Bowler and Donovan examine a variety of
states, elections, and sources of cues to conclude that while voters writ
large do not often maintain "full information" about propositions, they
"appear able to figure out what they are for and against in ways that
make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests."' This
general conclusion seems to hold across a myriad of empirical studies,
both at the individual and aggregate levels of analysis.
At the individual level, political scientist Arthur Lupia tested
voters' use of shortcuts using five California insurance reform
propositions in 1988.16 Lupia focused on the role of the insurance
industry and the "cues" the industry presented to voters, assuming that
as consumers of insurance, voters viewed the industry's position as
contrary to their own.17 He classified voters into three categories, the
first of which included those voters who were fully informed about the
propositions, thereby possessing "encyclopedic knowledge."" This
"encyclopedic knowledge" required voters to have an awareness of
the specific details of the proposition. For example, knowing which of
the five propositions established a "no fault" system of automobile
insurance. 1 The second group of voters was uninformed about
detailed clauses within each of the propositions.20 The third group of
voters did not have detailed "encyclopedic knowledge," but was aware
of the key cue in that election (for example, the position of the state's
insurance company industry on those propositions). 21 Lupia's results
show voters in the high information group voted differently than

15. SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION,
VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 168 (2000).

16. See Lupia, supra note 11, at 67.
17.

Id.

18. Id. at 69.
19. Id. at 73.
20. Id. at 71.
21.

Id.
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voters in the low information group.2 2 Most importantly, those who
were aware of the cues voted similarly to those who possessed
"encyclopedic knowledge" about the propositions,2 3 suggesting these
organizational cues can assist voters in a positive manner and get them
across the bridge to the islands of deliberation.
In candidate elections, the most relied-upon cue for a voter is the
partisanship of the politician. Initiative and referendum elections lack
the immediately identifiable mark of a partisan endorsement.
However, parties can and do play a significant role in the process. A
national study by Regina Branton using the Voter News Service exit
polls from 1992 through 1996 shows individual level partisan
affiliation is "strongly and consistently related to voting behavior
across each of the various types of ballot propositions." 24 David
Berman and Mike Yawn come to a similar conclusion after analyzing
316 propositions in Arizona from 1912 to 1996.25 Their work suggests
that parties play a big role in cueing the electorate and ultimately
providing a valuable piece of information for voters to use on election
day.
Christin, Hug, and Sciarini used referendum votes in Switzerland
to extend Lupia's work and investigate the varying effects of partisan
endorsement awareness on low and high information voters.2 6 Their
results show that low information voters who are aware of the partisan
cue vote more similarly to those who are highly informed than their
uninformed cue-less brethren. 27 This work provides yet another piece
of evidence that cues can assist voters in aligning their votes with their
preferences when they lack information.2 8

22. Id.
23. Id. at 72.
24. Regina Branton, Examining Individual-Level Voting Behavior on State
Ballot Propositions,56 POL. RES. Q. 367, 369 (2003).
25. David Berman & Mike Yawn, Partisanshipand Support for Propositions
on the Ballot: A State-Level LongitudinalStudy, 82 Soc. Sci. Q. 408, 408 (2001).
26. See generally Thomas Christin et al., Interests and Information in
Referendum Voting: An Analysis of Swiss Voters, 41 EUR. J. POL. RES. 759 (2002);
Arthur Lupia, Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information, 86 AM.
POL. Scl. REv. 390 (1992); Lupia, supra note 11.
27. Christin et al., supra note 26, at 773.
28. Id. at 769.
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In addition to organizational and partisan cues, high profile
political leaders can have an influence on voters' choices as well.
During the 2008 presidential primary and general elections in
California, Michael Binder conducted exit poll surveys testing the
effects of elite endorsements on voters' abilities to cast votes on
propositions in line with their stated issue preferences.2 9 The February
primary had seven propositions on the ballot, four of which were
referenda on alterations to Indian gaming compacts with the state.3 0 In
exchange for allowing an increased number of slot machines on tribal
land, the tribes agreed to increase the amount of revenue given to the
state. 3 1 The four referenda were marketed as a single-vote package,
and supporters of the agreement spent upwards of $108 million to
bolster support for them.3 2 Opposition groups, anchored by tribes not
involved in the deal and gambling organizations like racetracks that
would like to add slot machines to their offerings, spent over $64
million to defeat the gaming pacts. 33 Ultimately all four agreements
were passed by the voters with nearly identical passage rates around
55.6%.34 Binder showed voters who were aware that Schwarzenegger
supported those referenda and believed the Governor represented
people like them were ten percentage points more likely to vote
29. Michael Binder, Getting it Right or Playing it Safe? Correct Voting,
Confusion and the Status Quo Bias in Direct Democracy 1 (Sept. 1, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465780 (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Sept. 3-9, 2009).
30. Official Voter Information Guide: February5, 2008, PresidentialPrimary
Election, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE (Nov. 13, 2007), http://primary2008.sos.ca.gov/
voterguide/ (referencing Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97).
31. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE
SUPPLEMENT: FEBRUARY 5, 2008, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION 12-19 (2007),
available at http://primary2008.sos.ca.gov/voterguide/lang/englishsup.pdf
32. Supporters were mostly the Indian tribes named in the pacts and Governor

Schwarzenegger. Proposition94: Amend Indian Gaming Compact Between the State
and Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE
4 93
(last
POLITICS, www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m=
15.
at
29,
visited Nov. 2, 2011); see also Binder, supra note
33. Binder, supra note 29, at 15; see also NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE
POLITICS, supra note 32.
34. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: FEBRUARY 5, 2008,
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION 13 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/sov/2008_primary/13_votes for against.pdf.
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"correctly." 35 This effect is magnified for the least politically
informed, as they were fourteen percentage points more likely to vote
"correctly" if they were aware of the cue than those voters who did
not know Schwarzenegger supported the propositions. 36
The November 2008 elections had two controversial social issues
on the ballot: abortion and same-sex marriage.3 7 Proposition 4 aimed
to prohibit abortions for "unemancipated minor[s] until 48 hours after
[a] physician notifies [the] minor's parent or legal guardian." 38 This
was the third effort to pass this type of initiative in the last several
years and again the opposition, led by Planned Parenthood, outspent
supporters, this time by more than four to one. 39 This proposition
failed as only forty-eight percent voted "yes" to prohibit such
abortions. 40 Proposition 8, the extremely controversial measure
designed to constitutionally ban same-sex marriage, saw over $100
million pour into this campaign from all 50 states. 4 1 The "No on 8"
campaign, favoring same-sex marriage, spent over $64 million, while

35. Voting "correctly" refers to casting a ballot in line with the voter's
preferences. See Binder, supra note 29, at 3.
36. See id at 19-20.
37. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: NOVEMBER
4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION 24, 54 (2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov
/past/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov-2008-principal.pdf.
38. Id. at 24, 84; see Campaign Finance: Prop 4, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1302575&session
=2007 (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (referencing various committees formed to support
or oppose the ballot measure).
39. See Campaign for Teen Safety - Planned Parenthood Affiliates of
California,CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/
Detail.aspx?id= 1276142&session=2007&view-expenditures (last visited Nov. 2,
2011) (referencing expenditures by Planned Parenthood); cf Friends of Sarah, Yes
on Prop 4, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/
Detail.aspx?id=1298466&session=2007&view-expenditures (last visited Nov. 2,
2011) (referencing expenditures by Friends of Sarah).
40.

CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008,

GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008), availableat http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008
general/sov-complete.pdf.
41. See Campaign Finance: Proposition 8, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://cal(last
access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1302602&session=2007
visited Nov. 2, 2011) (referencing committees formed to support or oppose the
ballot measure).
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the "Yes on 8" campaign tallied over $42 million in expenditures.4 2
Both political parties staked out positions on this issue: the Republican
Party came out in support of the ban, while the Democratic Party
opposed it. 43 Awareness that Planned Parenthood opposed Proposition
4 and the Democrats opposed Proposition 8 while the Republicans
supported Proposition 8, led to an increase in "correct" voting of five
percentage points.4 For the least politically aware, that number
jumped more than seven percentage points.4 5 These two initiatives
show that even for issues voters are quite familiar with, cues are not
only a useful tool, but disproportionately aid the least politically astute
members of the electorate. These elections thus provide solid evidence
that not only can cues enable uninformed voters to cast more informed
votes, but as Binder's results show, awareness of these particular cues
is the most influential predictor of voters' ability to cast votes in line
with their preferences, i.e., to vote "correctly." 46
California is far from the only place where direct democracy
theories have been tested. Swiss political scientist, Hanspeter Kriesi,
analyzed Swiss direct democracy votes in 210 separate races from
1981 to 2004.47 Kriesi showed coalitions formed by political elites
across parties are much more successful at influencing the public than
divided coalitions are. 48 Kriesi concluded "coalition formation and
mobilization among the elites is likely to be decisive for the outcome
of direct-democratic votes." 49 In an additional study, Kriesi argued
that citizens often adopt simplifying strategies and that elites' cues
42. See id.
43. California Ballot Endorsements: November 4, 2008, General Election,
INST.

OF

GOVERNMENTAL

STUDIES,

http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/research/

quickhelp/elections/2008general/endorseNOV2008.html
(last updated Nov. 5,
2008).
44. Binder, supranote 29, at 19-20.
45. Id. at 20.
46. See RICHARD R. LAU & DAVID P. REDLAWSK, How VOTERS DECIDE:
INFORMATION PROCESSING DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (Dennis Chong & James

H. Kuklinski eds., 2006) for a detailed discussion of the concept of "correct" voting.
For this book's research, "correct" voting is operationalized as a voter casting a
ballot in line with their stated preferences.
47. See generally Hanspeter Kriesi, Role of The PoliticalElite in Swiss DirectDemocratic Votes, 2 PARTY POL. 599 (2006).
48. Id. at 618.
49. Id. at 619.
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play an important role in that process.5 0 In addition to his work on
elite cues, Kriesi analyzed another cue voters use when voting on
propositions: "trust." 5 1 Kriesi defined "trust" as the voter having faith
in government.5 2 The idea behind "trust" as a political cue is voters
who trust the government to act in accordance with the voters'
collective interests are more likely to support government projects.5 3
Conversely, skeptical voters are more inclined to oppose expanding
the government's role.5 4
Though many empirical studies show cues are very useful tools
for voters, particularly those who are least politically aware,5 5 they are
not a perfect solution for an under-informed and ill-attentive
electorate. Sara Binzer Hobolt begins to show the limitations of cues
in her study of a 1994 Norwegian referendum on European Union
(EU) membership.5 6 Her evidence suggests "voters can act
competently without detailed knowledge of the EU by relying on party
endorsements, if they have a basic knowledge of party positions on the
EU."5 7 This line of reasoning makes perfect sense. Indeed, how useful
can a cue be if voters are unable to connect it to a position held by the
endorser? Another potential hindrance to the successful use of cues is
when parties or other political organizations lack a clear position on
an issue. John Higley and Ian McAllister discuss how the political
elite's inability to uniformly endorse a 1999 referendum in Australia
led to its defeat, despite a clear majority of the population supporting
the concept.
50. Hanspeter Kriesi, How Citizens Decide in Direct-Democratic Votes:
Experiencesfrom Switzerland, 3 PORT. J. Soc. SC. 1, 3 (2004).
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 9.
53. See id. at 5.
54. Id. at 7.
55. See Christin et al., supra note 26; Arthur Lupia, Busy Voters, Agenda
Control, and the Power of Information, 86 AM. POL. SC. REv. 390, 391 (1992);
Lupia, supra note 11; Binder, supra note 29.
56. See Sara Binzer Hobolt, Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and
PartyEndorsements in Referendums on EuropeanIntegration, 42 EUR. J. POL. RES.
151 (2007).
57. Id. at 175.
58. See John Higley & Ian Mcallister, Elite Division and Voter Confusion:
Australia's Republic Referendum in 1999, 41 EUR. J. POL. RES. 845 (2002).
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Though citizens can and do successfully employ cues to match
their preferences to their votes, there are occasions when voters may
be led astray by the endorsements of popular political figures. Bowler
and Donovan, as well as political scientist Jeffrey Karp, detail the
story of how term limits moved through the direct democracy process
in Washington State.59 During the 1991 Washington elections, a limit
on legislators' terms in office was put on the ballot.60 Tom Foley,
Speaker of the House and very popular political figure, campaigned
heavily against the initiative, which initially showed support among
voters. 6 1 Foley's efforts were widely credited with helping to narrowly
defeat the initiative. 62 The following year, in the 1992 presidential
election, a supporter of term limits was able to get another proposal on
the ballot. 63 With Foley locked in a battle for reelection and opponents
of the initiative engaged in the other races on the ballot, the initiative
passed easily. 64
Voters rely on the information available to them, be it a signal
from a political organization, politician, political party, or simply their
general view of the government, as a way of aiding themselves in
making difficult decisions about often complex policies in direct
democracy. Though the evidence put forth in many of these empirical
studies is quite suggestive, experimental work both in the lab and the
field on this subject has bolstered these claims and attempted to flesh
out the true causal mechanism behind the role of cues in the world of
direct democracy.
III. FINDINGS FROM LABORATORY AND SURVEY EXPERIMENTS

In addition to examining natural variation across states, time, and
voters to understand decision-making in direct democracy elections,
political scientists also directly manipulate the information voters
59. See BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 15; Jeffrey Karp, Explaining Public
Supportfor Legislative Term Limits, 59 PUB. OPINION Q. 373 (1995).
60. David J. Olson, Term Limits Fail in Washington: The 1991 Battleground,
in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMs 65, 65 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael Malbin eds.,

1992).
61. See Karp, supra note 59, at 377.
62. See id.
63.

See id at 381.

64. See id at 373.
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receive in laboratory and survey experiments. 65 In contrast to the
aforementioned studies, political scientists using experiments to study
direct democracy randomly assign individuals to treatment and control
groups. They then systematically manipulate the groups' exposure to
information, while holding all other aspects of the decision-making
environment constant. In a typical experiment on decision-making in
direct democracy elections, individuals assigned to the control group
do not receive any information, while individuals assigned to the
treatment groups each receive different information types. 66 With such
experiments, political scientists are able to directly observe particular
outcomes of interest in debates about direct democracy under different
conditions. 67 They can then evaluate whether certain information
types induce changes in these outcomes, relative to when no
65. Political scientists often manipulate whether subjects in an experiment
receive party cues, endorsements from interest groups, detailed policy information,
and/or other types of information. For examples of these types of manipulations, see
ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNow? (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North
eds., 1998); Kevin Arceneaux, Can Partisan Cues Diminish Democratic
Accountability?, 30 POL. BEHAV. 139 (2008); Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap:
When Do Cues Eliminate Diferences Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated
Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009); John Bullock, Elite Influence on Public Opinion in
an Informed Electorate, 105 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 496 (2011); Geoffrey L. Cohen,
Party over Policy: The DominatingImpact of Group Influence on PoliticalBeliefs,
85 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003); Martin Gilens, PoliticalIgnorance
and Collective Policy Preferences, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 379 (2001); Shanto
Iyengar et al., The Stealth Campaign: Experimental Studies of Slate Mail in
California, 17 J.L. & POL. 295 (2001); Wendy M. Rahn, The Role of Partisan
Stereotypes in Information ProcessingAbout Political Candidates,37 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 472 (1993); Ellen D. Riggle et al., Bases of PoliticalJudgments: The Role of
Stereotypic and Nonstereotypic Information, 14 POL. BEHAV. 67 (1992); Cheryl
Boudreau & Scott A. MacKenzie, Informing the Electorate? How Party Cues and
Policy Information Affect Public Opinion About Initiatives (Aug. 27, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1901608 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Seattle, WA).
66. For example, individuals in a treatment group may receive an endorsement
or detailed policy information. See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 65;
Boudreau, supra note 65; Gilens, supra note 65.
67. That is, they can observe the opinions individuals express or the decisions
they make. For examples, see generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 65;
Boudreau, supra note 65; Gilens, supra note 65; Boudreau & MacKenzie, supra
note 65.
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information is provided or when other information types are
provided.6 8
These experiments allow political scientists to make precise
causal claims about the conditions under which different types of
information affect voters' opinions and decisions in direct democracy
elections. 69 Although experiments necessarily lack real world direct
democracy elections' complexities, they provide a controlled setting
to observe information's effects without the confounding events that
occur in the real world. These advantages are precisely why political
scientists have used experiments to study the effects of several
commonplace information types-namely, endorsements, policy
information, and the frames (for example, arguments or
interpretations) political elites use when describing ballot
propositions.7 0
In this section, we discuss several prominent experiment examples
that manipulate one or more of these information types. These
experiments reveal conditions under which such information helps
voters who lack detailed information about ballot propositions to
make more informed decisions in direct democracy elections. Taken
together, the results suggest important lessons for political elites who
seek to influence voters and for reformers who seek to improve
citizens' decisions in direct democracy elections.
A. The Effects of Endorsements
Several political scientists use experiments to study the effects of
endorsements on voters' decisions. These scholars recognize: (1) that
68. For a related discussion of the causal leverage experiments provide, see
Cheryl Boudreau & Arthur Lupia, PoliticalKnowledge, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 171 (James N. Druckman et al. eds., 2011);
WILLIAM R. SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
(Wadsworth Publ'g 2001); WILLIAM M. K. TROCHIM & JAMES P. DONNELLY, THE
RESEARCH METHODS KNOWLEDGE BASE (3d ed. 2006).
69. Boudreau & Lupia, supra note 68.
70. See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 65; Boudreau, supra note
65; Gilens, supra note 65; Iyengar et al., supra note 65; Boudreau & MacKenzie,
supra note 65; Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, The Case of the Stolen
Initiative: Were the Voters Framed? (Apr. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1643448##
at
available
(American Political Science Association 2010 annual meeting paper).
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voters typically lack detailed information about politics, and (2) that
such information deficits may be particularly pronounced in direct
democracy elections where voters must make decisions about complex
policy issues without the aid of party labels provided on the ballot.7
Rather than deem voters incompetent to make such decisions, these
scholars identify conditions under which uninformed voters can use
endorsements as substitutes for more detailed political information. 72
For example, Lupia and McCubbins use laboratory experiments to
assess the conditions under which uninformed voters trust the
statements of an endorser,7 3 and ultimately improve their decisions. 74
In the experiments, subjects predict the outcomes of coin tosses and
earn money each time they make a correct prediction. 75 However,
subjects do not observe the coin toss outcomes before making their
predictions.7 6 In this way, subjects lack relevant information to the
task at hand. However, before making their predictions, another
subject (acting as "the speaker") observes each coin toss outcome, and
then states whether the coin landed on heads or tails.7 7 As in real
world direct democracy campaigns, subjects know the speaker has no
obligation be truthful.78 After receiving the speaker's statement,
subjects predict each coin toss outcome. 79
In various treatment conditions, Lupia and McCubbins manipulate
the perceived credibility of the speaker.8 For example, in one
treatment condition, subjects receive statements from a speaker who

71. See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 65; Boudreau, supra note
65; Cheryl Boudreau, Making Citizens Smart: When Do Institutions Improve
Unsophisticated Citizens' Decisions?, 31 POL. BEHAV. 287 (2009); Boudreau &
MacKenzie, supra note 65.
72. See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 65; Boudreau, supra note
65; Boudreau, supra note 71.
73. The endorser is dubbed "the speaker" in their experiments.
74. LuPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 65.
75. Id. at 101.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 101-02.
78. See id. at 108.
79. Seeid. at 111.
80. That is, they manipulate the extent to which the speaker is known to be
knowledgeable and trustworthy. Id. at 109.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol48/iss1/3

14

Binder et al.: Shortcuts to Deliberation? How Cues Reshape the Role of Informati

2011]

SHORTCUTS TO DELIBERATION?

Ill

shares common interests with them.81 In another treatment condition,
subjects receive statements from a speaker whose interests conflict
with their own, but who is subject to an institution (namely, a penalty
for lying or threat of verification) that gives the speaker an incentive
to make truthful statements. 82 Lupia and McCubbins vary the presence
of common versus conflicting interests, as well as the size of the
penalty for lying, by manipulating the financial incentives of subjects
and the speaker. 83
The results of Lupia and McCubbins' experiments reveal
conditions under which subjects trust the speaker's statements and
make correct decisions. 84 Specifically, their results show when the
speaker shares common interests with subjects, subjects trust the
speaker's statements and make correct predictions at a rate that is
substantially greater than chance.8 5 Similarly, when a sufficiently
large penalty for lying or threat of verification is imposed upon the
speaker, subjects trust the speaker's statements at a rate closer to that
at which they trust the speaker's statements when the speaker shares
common interests with the voters. 86 In this way, Lupia and
McCubbins' results indicate that when an endorser is perceived as
credible, uninformed voters trust his or her statements and make better
decisions than they would have made on their own.87
Building on Lupia and McCubbins' experiments, Boudreau
further investigates the conditions under which endorsements help
voters with their decisions." Indeed, one question Lupia and
McCubbins' experiments leave open is whether a credible endorser's
statements help both more and less knowledgeable voters to make
informed decisions. To address this question, Boudreau replicates
Lupia and McCubbins' experiments using math problems instead of
81. Id. at 119.
82. Id. at 133-39.
83. Id. at 101-35.
84. Id. at 101-48.
85. The speaker, by and large, makes truthful statements when he or she shares
common interests with subjects, which helps them to make better decisions. The
same is true when the speaker is subject to a sufficiently large penalty for lying or
probability of verification. Id. at 145-46.
86. Id.
87. That is, by guessing randomly.
88. Boudreau, supra note 65.
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coin tosses. 89 One advantage of using math problems is subjects vary
in their levels of preexisting knowledge; that is, some subjects are
quite knowledgeable about solving math problems, while others are
not. A second advantage is that there exists a valid, reliable, and
agreed upon measure of subjects' levels of preexisting knowledge
about this type of decision-namely, SAT math scores. Boudreau,
therefore, collects subjects' SAT math scores prior to the
experiments. 90 This enables her to analyze whether and when an
endorser's statements help less knowledgeable subjects to behave as
though they are more knowledgeable.9 1
The results of Boudreau's experiments demonstrate that a credible
endorser's statements close the gap between more and less
knowledgeable subjects' decisions. 92 That is, when an endorser shares
common interests with subjects, is subject to a sufficiently large
penalty for lying, or faces a sufficiently high probability of
verification, both more and less knowledgeable subjects achieve large
improvements in their decisions (relative to more and less
knowledgeable subjects in the control group, who answer the
problems on their own).9 3 Further, the endorser's statements help less
knowledgeable subjects improve their decision-making so much that
the gap between their decisions and those of more knowledgeable
subjects closes. 94 In this way, Boudreau's results suggest that an
endorser's statements may be more helpful to voters who have little
preexisting knowledge about their decisions. 95 They also indicate that
these less knowledgeable voters can use an endorser's statements to
help them behave as though they possess more knowledge.9 6 This
result is encouraging for direct democracy elections, where many
voters lack preexisting knowledge about the choices they must make.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
and less
95.
96.

Id. at 966.
Id. at 968.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 973-74.
Id. at 973.
Id. Indeed, there is no significant difference between the decisions of more
knowledgeable subjects under these conditions.
Id. at 974-75.
Id.
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An advantage of Boudreau's and Lupia and McCubbins'
experiments is the use of tasks that have objectively correct or
incorrect choices. This enables the precise measurement of whether
and when an endorser's statements help subjects make better decisions
than they would have made on their own.9 7 But what does it mean to
make "better" decisions in real world direct democracy elections?
What effects do endorsements have on citizens' decisions about actual
ballot propositions? Iyengar, Lowenstein, and Masket address these
questions by conducting experiments in which subjects receive either
partisan or nonpartisan endorsements before reporting how they intend
to vote on current ballot propositions.9 8 In doing so, lyengar et al.
retain the precise causal leverage that experiments provide, while
simultaneously using an experimental task that, on its face, is more
similar to real world political contexts. 99
Specifically, Iyengar et al. conducted experiments just before the
1998 general election in California. 00 They recruited Democratic and
Independent voters at a farmers market in Santa Monica and asked
them to report how they intended to vote on the candidates and ballot
propositions at issue in that election.' 0 ' Subjects assigned to the
control group did not receive any additional information before
reporting how they intended to vote.' 02 Subjects assigned to the
treatment groups received a piece of slate mail (based on an actual
slate mailer used in that election) that endorsed Democratic candidates
and positions on ballot propositions.10 3 In different treatment groups,
Iyengar et al. manipulated the slate mail to appear either partisan or
nonpartisan.1 04 That is, in one treatment group, the slate mail was
headed "Attention Democrats" and closed with the statement, "END
THE WASHINGTON WITCH HUNT. VOTE DEMOCRAT. TELL
97. For a related discussion of these studies, see Boudreau & Lupia, supra
note 68.
98. Iyengar et al., supra note 65.
99. Id. Stated differently, their experiments are higher in mundane realism. Id.
See generally Eliot Aronson et al., Experimentation in Social Psychology, in THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 99 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010).
100. Iyengar et al., supra note 65, at 316.
101. Id. at 320-21.
102. Id. at 320.
103. Id. at 316-20.
104. Id. at 317-19.
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THE REPUBLICANS TO GET BACK TO THE BUSINESS OF
RUNNING THE COUNTRY." 05 In another treatment group, the slate
mail was headed "Attention Independent Voters" and closed with the
statement, "USE THIS GUIDE WHEN YOU VOTE FOR
GOVERNOR AND OTHER IMPORTANT OFFICES AND
ISSUES."l 0 6 Importantly, both types of slate mail contained
endorsements of the exact same candidates and ballot propositions;
the only differences were the headings and closing statements.' 0 7
The results of Iyengar and his colleagues' experiments show that
endorsements listed on slate mail influence Democratic and
Independent subjects' intended votes for ballot propositions.'"
Specifically, the percentage of Independents who voted in accordance
with the endorsements listed on the slate mail increased by twenty
points.10 9 The percentage of Democrats who voted in accordance with
the endorsements increased by five points.'o Not surprisingly,
Democrats in the control group were more likely to vote in the
endorsed, Democratic direction than Independents in the control
group."' Further, Independents and Democrats who received the slate
mail were equally likely to adopt the positions endorsed on it, 112
which indicates that the influence of slate mail is not contingent on
subjects' partisanship. Interestingly, the results also suggest that
Democratic and Independent subjects were more likely to follow the
endorsements listed on the slate mail when the content was ostensibly
nonpartisan, as opposed to partisan. Taken together, Iyengar et al.'s
results indicate that endorsements listed on slate mail can have
powerful effects on partisan and nonpartisan voters' decisions about
ballot propositions." 3 For Democratic voters, these endorsements

105. Id. at 318-19.
106. Id. at 319.
107. Id. at 316-19.
108. Id. at 324. Iyengar et al. find that slate mail did little to alter voter
intentions in partisan elections. Id. at 325-26.
109. Id. at 324.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Of course, whether this is a normatively good or bad outcome depends
upon a variety of factors. Id. at 331-32.
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helped them to make decisions that were consistent with their own
party's positions-and presumably, their own partisan interests.
B. The Effects ofPolicy Information
Political scientists also use experiments to assess the effects of
detailed policy information-another type of information that is
frequently disseminated during direct democracy elections. Indeed,
scholars, "good government" groups, and others have developed
websites and mailers that aim to provide voters with substantive
information about the consequences that passing certain ballot
propositions will likely have on public policy.114 But does this
information actually influence voters' ability to express informed
opinions about public policy issues? Or, do voters simply ignore such
information, choosing instead to rely on simpler, easier-to-use cues,
such as endorsements?
To address the first question, Gilens conducts survey experiments
in which he randomly determines whether respondents receive
detailed policy information about crime and foreign aid." 5
Respondents in the treatment group receive information about two
news stories: one story indicates that the crime rate in the United
States has decreased, and the other shows that the amount of money
the United States spends on foreign aid has decreased.1 6 Respondents
in the control group are only told that news stories about the crime
rate and foreign aid have been released.' 17 Gilens then asks
respondents in the treatment and control groups to state their level of
support for spending on prison construction and foreign aid." 8
Gilens' results show that policy information influences
respondents' opinions."' That is, respondents in the treatment group
(who are told that crime and foreign aid have decreased) are less likely
to support increasing spending on prison construction and decreasing
114. A prominent example of a website designed to inform voters is
CalifomiaChoices.org. This website provides detailed information about ballot
propositions and prospects for reform in California.
115. Gilens, supra note 65, at 381.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 382.
119. Id. at 384-85.
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spending on foreign aid, relative to respondents in the control
group. 120 In this way, Gilens suggests that voters' ignorance of policy
information may prevent them from expressing informed opinions.121
Although Gilens' experiments indicate that policy information
influences voter opinions, his experiments only expose respondents to
policy information alone.' 22 Thus, his experiments leave open the
question of whether policy information influences voters' opinions
even when easier-to-use cues are also available. This question is an
important one to address, given that voters in direct democracy
elections have many different sources of information available to
them, some of which are easier to use or interpret than others.
To disentangle the relative effects of policy information and cues
in direct democracy elections, Boudreau and MacKenzie conducted
survey experiments during the 2010 general election in California.123
In the experiments, all respondents read short descriptions of the nine
ballot propositions at issue in the election.124 Respondents in the
control group expressed their opinions without any additional
information.125 Respondents in the treatment groups received either
cues, 126 detailed policy information about the likely consequences of
passing each initiative, or both cues and policy information.1 27
Consistent with Gilens' results, Boudreau and MacKenzie found
that policy information, by itself, influences respondents' opinions
about ballot propositions in the expected direction.' 28 Policy
information also continues to influence respondents' opinions when
easier-to-use party endorsements are also provided. 129 However, the
presence of party endorsements changes the way certain types of
respondents react to the policy information.' 30 Specifically,
120. Id. at 385.
121. For a related discussion of this study, see Boudreau & Lupia, supra note
68.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Gilens, supra note 65, at 391.
See generally Boudreau & MacKenzie, supra note 65.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8-9.
In this case, the political parties' endorsements of each initiative. Id. at 9.
Boudreau & MacKenzie, supra note 65, at 9-12.
Id. at 20-21.
Id.
Id. at 22-26.
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respondents who are strong partisans or knowledgeable about politics
respond to policy information in a biased, partisan way when party
endorsements are also present.' 3 1 For example, policy information that
undermines the positions of a strong partisan's party on various
propositions has a much smaller affect on the partisan's opinions
when the party's positions are also made known.132 Thus, although
voters clearly respond to policy information, their responses may
change when their party's endorsements are also provided. 133
C. FramingEffects
Political scientists also use experiments to study whether the
frames political elites use to describe ballot propositions affect voters'
opinions. In states with direct democracy, political and legal battles
often erupt over the titles of ballot propositions, as well as the wording
of summaries that appear on the ballot.134 Such battles reflect a belief
that how ballot propositions are framed affects voters' opinions and
decisions about the propositions. Is this really the case?
For decades, political science experiments have indicated that
battles over the wording of ballot propositions are rationally fought.
Indeed, countless experiments show that the manner in which a policy
issue is framed affects subjects' opinions about it.135 A canonical
131.

Id.

132. Id. at 23-24.
133. See id.; Arceneaux, supra note 65; Cohen, supra note 65; Rahn, supra
note 65; Riggle et al., supra note 65. See Bullock, supra note 65, for other
interesting experiments on the relative effects of party endorsements and policy
information.
134. A prominent example is the controversy surrounding the wording of the
ballot title and summary of Proposition 8 in California. See Burnett & Kogan, supra
note 70, at 3-5, for a discussion of this controversy.
135. See generally SHANTO IYENGAR, Is ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? How
TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991); JOHN R.
ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1992);
Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibility for PoliticalIssues: The Case of Poverty,
12 POL. BEHAV. 19 (1990); Shanto Iyengar, Television News and Citizens'
Explanations of National Affairs, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 815 (1987); Jennifer Jerit,
How Predictive Appeals Affect Policy Opinions, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 411 (2009);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Richard R. Lau et al., PoliticalBeliefs,
Policy Interpretations,and PoliticalPersuasion, 53 J. POL. 644 (1991); Thomas E.
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example of such an experiment is Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley's
study.'3 6 In their experiments, subjects express their opinions about
whether a hate group should be permitted to hold a rally on their
campus.' 3 7 Subjects in one treatment group read a newspaper article
that framed the issue as one concerning free speech 138 Subjects in
another treatment group read a newspaper article that framed the issue
as one concerning public safety.' 39 A framing effect occurs in these
experiments because subjects were more supportive of the hate group
rally when free speech concerns were raised than when public safety
concerns were raised.14 0 Results like these prompted serious concerns
about the ability of political elites to manipulate voters' preferences
and choices, particularly in direct democracy elections where the
policy issues are often complex and party labels are not on the ballot
to guide voters' decisions.
More recently, however, political scientists have used experiments
to identify conditions under which framing effects are likely to occur
in real-world political contexts. Most notably, James Druckman and
his colleagues conduct experiments in laboratory and survey
environments that are more similar to real world political contexts. 14 1
Nelson et al., Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its Effect on
Tolerance, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1997).
136. Nelson et al., supra note 135.
137. Id. at 575.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See generally Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Dynamic Public
Opinion: Communication Effects over Time, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663 (2010)
[hereinafter Chong & Druckman, Dynamic Public Opinion]; Dennis Chong & James
N. Druckman, FramingPublic Opinion in Competitive Democracies, 101 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 637 (2007) [hereinafter Chong & Druckman, Competitive Democracies];
James N. Druckman et al., Competing Rhetoric over Time: Frames Versus Cues, 72
J. POL. 136 (2007) [hereinafter Druckman et al., Competing Rhetoric over Time];
James N. Druckman, On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?, 63 J.
POL. 1041 (2001) [hereinafter Druckman, On the Limits of FramingEffects]; James
N. Druckman, PoliticalPreference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the
(Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 671 (2004) [hereinafter
Druckman, PoliticalPreference Formation];James N. Druckman, Using Credible
Advice to Overcome Framing Effects, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62 (2001) [hereinafter
Druckman, Using Credible Advice]; James N. Druckman & Kjersten R. Nelson,
Framingand Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence 47
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They suggest that previous experiments on framing omit important
features of real world elections that may mitigate framing effects. 142
Chief among these features are credible endorsements,1 4 3 competing
frames or arguments from other sources, 144 and group discussions with
other voters. 14 5 By randomly assigning subjects in experiments to
receive different frames with or without credible endorsements, with
or without competing frames, and with or without group discussions,
Druckman and his colleagues demonstrate that these features of realworld elections can reduce political elites' ability to use framing to
sway voters' opinions.
Building on Druckman's results, Burnett and Kogan conducted
survey experiments that directly assessed the effects of ballot
proposition framing on citizens' opinions about them.14 6 In different
treatment groups, the experimenters manipulated how ballot
propositions were framed, as well as whether interest group
endorsements were provided.147 They then asked respondents to state
whether they would vote for each proposition.148 Results indicate that
although the framing of ballot propositions affected respondents'
propensity to vote for them, these framing effects were much smaller
when interest group endorsements were also provided. 149 In this way,
AM.J. OF POL. SCI. 729 (2003) [hereinafter Druckman & Nelson, Framing and
Deliberation].
142. See generally Chong & Druckman, Competitive Democracies, supra note
141; Chong & Druckman, Dynamic Public Opinion, supra note 141; Druckman, On
the Limits of Framing Effects, supra note 141; Druckman, Political Preference
Formation, supra note 141; Druckman, Using Credible Advice to Overcome
Framing Effects, supra note 141; Druckman & Nelson, Framing and Deliberation,
supra note 141.
143. From political parties, for example. See generally Druckman, On the
Limits of FramingEffects, supra note 141; Druckman, Using Credible Advice, supra
note 141.
144. Chong & Druckman, Competitive Democracies, supra note 141; Chong
& Druckman, Dynamic Public Opinion, supra note 141; Druckman et al.,
Competing Rhetoric over Time, supra note 141.
145. Druckman, PoliticalPreferenceFormation,supra note 141; Druckman &
Nelson, Framingand Deliberation,supra note 141.
146. Burnett & Kogan, supra note 70.
147. Id. at 12-15.
148. Id. at 12.
149. Id. at 24.
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Burnett and Kogan's experiments indicate that the framing of ballot
propositions may affect voters' decisions on low-salience
propositions, where there is little campaign activity and few
endorsements from major interest groups.15 0 However, on more high
profile propositions that receive vigorous campaign activity and
prominent interest group endorsements, concerns over ballot language
and framing effects may be overstated.' 5 '
D. Lessons Learnedfrom Laboratoryand Survey Experiments
The studies described in this section take advantage of the causal
leverage experiments provide in order to address important questions
about the conditions under which different types of information help
voters to make informed decisions in direct democracy elections.
Collectively, the results suggest a number of lessons for those who
seek to understand and improve voters' decisions in direct democracy
elections. Specifically, credible endorsements from political parties or
interest groups can help uninformed voters to determine whether
particular propositions are in their interests and whether they should
vote for or against them.152 The detailed policy information that "good
government" groups and others disseminate can also help voters with
their choices. However, endorsements from political parties and
interest groups can affect the way voters process more detailed
information. Such endorsements can cause voters to become more
resistant to the frames elites use, but also more likely to respond to
information in a biased, partisan way.'5 3
In a nutshell, both cues and policy information can help voters
make informed decisions in direct democracy elections, but these two
types of information interact in subtle and often overlooked ways.
Thus, a. complete understanding of voters' decisions in direct
democracy elections will require further study of the ways in which
voters choose from and use the multiple sources of information that
exist in these elections. Experiments will undoubtedly play an
important role in such future studies, as will observational studies like
150. Id
151. Id
152. LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 65; Boudreau, supra note 65; Boudreau
& MacKenzie, supra note 65; Burnett & Kogan, supranote 70.
153. Boudreau & MacKenzie, supra note 65, at 25.
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those described in the previous section. Indeed, if experimental and
observational studies yield similar findings about the effects of
particular types of information, then scholars will have even greater
confidence in their conclusions about how such information affects
voters' decisions. Thus, by combining the precise causal leverage of
experiments with the external validity of observational studies,
scholars will further increase the validity of their conclusions about
voter decision making in direct democracy elections.
IV. PROPOSALS TO SPUR DELIBERATION IN DIRECT
DEMOCRACY ELECTIONS

Though there is clearly more to be discovered from both
experimental and observational studies of cues and direct democracy
voting, many of the lessons that have been learned are being translated
into practice by real-world campaigns and reforms. Few of these
reforms are framed as mechanisms to enhance deliberation, but we
can evaluate them through this lens. We do so here, grouping reforms
by the type of deliberation they are intended to address.
The first category of reforms groups proposals aimed at requiring
elite deliberation. Former Assembly member John Laird's A.B.
1245,154 though modest in its goals, would have enhanced the
potential for deliberation by instituting a formal notice-and-comment
period for California initiatives. This would allow "[a]ny interested
person or interest . .. [to] provide comments to the author, other

By putting the proponents of
legislators, or legislative committees."
initiatives into conversation with other relevant political actorsconversations in the form of policy debates, which could lead to
amendments, or might simply provide clarity about a proponent's
intent-a formal notice-and-comment period could help create the
conditions that are associated with deliberative democracy.156 It would
do so for the large range of proposed initiatives that are in circulation
but which have not yet qualified for the ballot.

154. Governor Gray Davis vetoed A.B. 1245 in 2003. John Laird & Clyde
Macdonald, More Deliberation? Perspectives on the California Initiative Process
and the Problems and Promise of its Reform, 47 CAL. W. L. REv. 301, 308 (2011).
155. Id. at 306.
156. Id. at 304-06.
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For ballot measures that qualify for the ballot, California
supposedly requires hearings on the measures, but they only take
place when a Senate or Assembly Committee elects to hold one. 5 7
The relevant standing policy committee holds hearings, which
typically go into greater depth and thus provide more opportunity for
elite deliberation than hearings held on the many bills pending before
these committees.' For instance, the Senate Environmental Quality
Committee's October 2010 Proposition 23 hearing reserved forty-five
minutes on its agenda for public comment. 159 The Senate Governance
and Finance Committee's September 2004 Proposition 65 hearing was
televised, attended by four legislators and approximately forty
audience members, and featured testimony from five state agency
officials.1 60 An examination of committee records revealed the
legislature also held hearings on Propositions 4, 63, and 71 in
September 2004; Proposition 1B in October 2006; Proposition 17 in
March 2010; and Proposition 22 in September 20 10.161
Perhaps the most innovative experiment in elite deliberation is the
new Oregon Citizens Initiative Review Commission, a panel that will
bring together a randomly selected group of twenty-four citizens to
review an initiative in great depth. Based on the "citizen jury"
methodology developed by Ned Crosby and the Jefferson Center in
Minneapolis,' 62 this process constitutes a citizens panel that will learn
background information about a ballot measure, hear pro and con
157. Interview with California State Assembly Staff, in Cal. (June 2011); see
also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9034 (West Supp. 2011).
158. Interview with California State Assembly Staff, supra note 157.
159. Suspension of California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 Until
California Unemployment Rate is 5.5% or Less for One Year: Joint hearing on
Proposition23 Before the S. Comm. on Envtl. Quality & Assemb. Comm. on Natural
Res., 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess:, at 4 (Cal. 2010), available at
http://senv.senate.ca.gov/sites/senv.senate.ca.gov/files/PROP23.pdf.
160. S. & AsSEMB. LOCAL Gov'T COMMs., SUMMARY REPORT FROM THE
PROPOSITION 65: LOCAL TAXPAYERS AND PUBLIC SAFETY PROTECTION ACT
INFORMATIONAL HEARING, S. 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1-2 (Cal. 2004),
available at http://senweb03.senate.ca.gov/committee/standing/GOVERNANCE/
PROP65SUMMARYREPORT.pdf
161. Interview with California State Assembly Staff, supra note 157.
162. DeAnna Martin, Citizen Initiative Review to Educate Oregonians on
Ballot Measures, Soc. CAP. REv. (Apr. 20, 2010), http://socialcapitalreview.org/
citizen-initiative-review-to-educate-oregonians-on-ballot-measures- 2 /.
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arguments, and deliberate for five days. They will produce a one-page
analysis of the proposition that will appear in the state's voter
pamphlet.1 63 After conducting a privately funded pilot trial of the
process was conducted in 2010, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber
signed the bill to publicly sanction the process in June, 201 1.164
Explicitly aimed at bringing a deliberative democracy model into
practice, this process encourages panelists to make informed,
generalized arguments, and then conveys their analysis and
recommendations to voters. It is not, however, without its critics.
Proponents of a ballot measure reviewed during the Commission's
pilot exercise argued that "panelists were not screened to assemble a
group that started out with a balanced view on the topic, they were not
allowed to cross-examine opponents of the measure-only panelists
could ask questions-and witnesses were not questioned under
oath."1 65 As this experiment plays out on a grander scale, it will
undoubtedly provide more opportunities to research how voters use
commission members' information and cues.
A second category places reforms and informal campaigns
designed to provide voters with a better informational basis for their
deliberations together. One way to do this is to enact provisions that
require initiative proponents themselves to more completely describe
their measures' policy consequences through the so-called "PAYGO"
requirements in place in Arizona and proposed in California. Such
laws force ballot measure backers to detail the new revenue sources or
spending cuts that would be required to implement their initiative.
Arizona's 2004 Proposition 101 applies only to initiatives that create
new programs, 166 while proposals in California-pending
constitutional amendments A.C.A. 6, A.C.A. 7, and S.C.A. 4 in the
163. Press Release, Oregon State Legislature, Citizens Initiative Review
Commission Extended (May 23, 2011), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/
pressreleases/hdo_052311 .pdf.
164. See Editorial, Initiative Review Adds Voices of Reason, CORVALLIS
GAZETTE-TiMES (June 20, 2011), http://www.gazettetimes.com/news/opinion/
editorial/article 2a3ea93e-9ad3-l l e0-8193-001cc4c03286.html.
165. Jennie Drage Bowser, A PilotProject in Oregon Would Make the Ballot a
Tool for Civic Education, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=21419 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
166. Ariz. Proposition 101 (2004), http://www.azsos.gov/election/2004/info/
pubpamphlet/english/propl01.htm (codified in ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 23).
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state legislature-would apply both to new programs and to tax
cuts. 167

There are many less formal approaches to providing voters with
access to encyclopedic information about measures. This information
can be delivered either through traditional small group meetings held
by a variety of community groups, most prominently the League of
Women Voters, or through web sites such as the League's
"Smartvoter.org" site and "Ballotpedia.org." The longest standing
examples of this approach, of course, are the ballot pamphlets
describing propositions that are automatically mailed to voters in
some, but not all, states.
A third category of reforms aims to provide voters with clear cues,
whether they deliberate or not, and whether they access encyclopedic
information or search for shortcuts. One cue all those who enter a
voting booth receive is the initiative's title. This piece of information
may appear basic, but it is far from neutral. Jamie Druckman's stream
of experimental studies show framing effects can be influential. 168
Further, political campaigns often contest ballot titles and summaries
written by state appointed and elected officials. In a search for a
neutral, deliberative body to write these titles, Colorado created a
ballot title board before which initiative sponsors appear to receive an
official title before they even circulate a ballot measure.' 69 The board
engages in give-and-take with the proponents to clarify their intent in
a public hearing.
In California, a proposal that passed the state legislature would
have provided voters with a different kind of cue by printing on the
state's ballot pamphlet the five largest contributors to the campaign
for any initiative, as well as to the campaign against it.170 To allow for
167. Analyses of each measure are available on the California Legislature's
bill information website: leginfo.ca.gov (follow "Bill Information" hyperlink; then
search "ACA 6," "ACA 7," or "SCA 4" where Session dropdown option "(20112012) CURRENT" is selected). A description of the policy arguments is contained
in Wyatt Buchanan, Bill Would Require Funding Source for Initiatives, S.F. CHRON.
(May 2, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/05/04/
BAMRlJBIN2.DTL.
168. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
169. Preparation of a Ballot Title and Summary, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?Tabld=16586 (last visited
Nov. 8, 2011).
170. S.B. 334, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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printing of the ballot pamphlet, State Senator Mark DeSaulnier's S.B.
334 only applied to contributors who had given more than $50,000
110 days or more before an election.'' This long lead time caused
concern that major donors would simply wait until the deadline had
passed to make a contribution. In fact, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed
this bill, just as Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed a similar
bill, S.B. 1202, for that reason. 172
Less formal mechanisms also exist to give voters clear cues about
ballot measures. The website CaliforniaChoices.org lists the
endorsements and formal opposition statements of parties, interest
groups, and newspaper editorial boards for all propositions on
California ballots. It also gives visitors the opportunity to make their
own endorsements, and use email or social media to communicate
these cues to their friends and family. In the weeks before the
November 2010 election, nearly 50,000 users visited this site and
spent an average of more than five minutes on it.17 3
Finally, Facebook provides supporters and opponents of ballot
measures with many opportunities to signal their stances and to send
others in their social networks this cue. Based on a survey conducted
in June 2011, the Facebook page "Vote Yes on Proposition 19"
reported that 29,640 users "liked" this failed 2010 California initiative
to legalize marijuana possession,174 and 20,352 users liked a page set
up in opposition to Proposition 23.175 Campaigns and other groups
that effectively harness social media could, for better or worse, spread
a large number of personal cues very quickly.
17 1. Id.
172. Gov. Edmund G. Brown's Veto Message to S.B. 334 (Oct. 11, 2011),
available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1 1-12/bill/sen/sb_0301-0350/sb_334_vt_
20111007.html; Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to S.B. 1202 (Sept.
9, 2010), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_12011250/sb_ 1202 vt_20100923.html.
173. Authors Michael Binder and Thad Kousser disclose that they are part of
the collaborative of academic centers and organizations that designed and promoted
this website.
174. Vote Yes On Proposition 19, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
VoteYesOnProposition19 (last visited August 22, 2011).
175. Proposition 23 was a 2010 measure which would have suspended the
state's global climate change regulations, but which was defeated. Stop Dirty Energy
Prop, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/StopDirtyEnergyProp (last visited
September 29, 2011).
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V. Do CUES HELP OR HINDER DELIBERATION?
What are the implications of these tentative findings for
deliberation? Providing more information to voters about the nature of
policy proposals, especially in the realm of direct democracy where
voter knowledge is so often called into question, enhances
deliberation. Indeed, placing "a large set of arguments .. . on the
table" helps to satisfy Steiner's concerns about the lack of deliberation
in many political contexts.' 76 When parties and interest groups weigh
in with their endorsements, their frequently conflicting messages
implicitly bring different arguments into tension with each other;
however, this shortcut to civic debate surely falls short of Cohen's
standard that participants in deliberation "aim to defend and criticize
institutions and programs in terms of considerations that others have
reasons to accept." 77
In fact, it is the dual role of party and interest group cues that
presents the most significant threat to deliberation. First, these
messages are meant to signal the narrow interests of particular sets of
voters rather than to appeal to the broader interests of all voters-for
example, Initiative X is good for Republicans, while the Sierra Club
wants its members to support Initiative Y. Second, such narrow
appeals set the frame for how voters view encyclopedic information,
making voters less receptive to arguments that do not support their
side. In this way, partisan and interest group cues push voters toward
making decisions based on their individual preferences at the same
time they inoculate voters against wider ranges of information that
might broaden their perspectives.
From the viewpoint of deliberative democracy advocates, the role
played by partisan interest group cues appears to be unequivocally
bad. Instead of pushing voters to encounter each other "as citizens
searching for common ground ... in a common enterprise,"' 78 these
narrow cues are pushing voters in the way that Ackerman and Fishkin
espouse: toward ethnic, religious, or partisan voting blocs.
Not all cues are bad for deliberation, of course. Cues that make
factual information more readily available (such as Pay-As-You-Go
176. Steiner, supra note 8, at 5-6.
177. Cohen, supra note 5, at 185.
178. Ackerman & Fishkin, supra note 1, at 22.
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provisions or the listing of top campaign funders), as well as cues
from bodies such as Oregon's Citizen Initiative Review Commission
that are constituted to pursue something like Rousseau's "General
Will," can aid deliberation. But those signals only help if they are
heard by voters. For those who make normative arguments for
deliberative democracy, the most troubling revelation is that cues from
parties and narrow interests seem to dampen the effects of those
beneficial, broadly oriented cues.
Yet from a different democratic perspective-for those who
simply want elections to lead to policy choices that maximize social
welfarel 79 -party and interest group cues may play the role of the
heroes rather than villains. While they may not spur deliberation, these
cues provide reliable shortcuts that let voters translate individual
interests into votes. Lupia's influential study in California and work
by Christin, Hug, and Sciarini in Europe demonstrate party and
interest group cues can help a substantial portion of the electorate cast
the vote that fits their policy preferences.so Certainly these appeals
are narrow, but those who see the goal of politics as delivering
rational social choices could ask what is wrong with voters basing
their decisions on how to regulate car insurance, taxation and
government spending levels, or even social policy based on their
personal interests and values?
These questions address a broader debate over deliberative
democracy. Though there are clearly many appealing aspects of the
deliberation process, recent critiques question the outcomes it delivers.
Gastil and Dillard note that "[d]eliberative democratic theorists
maintain that if citizens reach more reflective political judgments, they
will directly and indirectly lead the polity toward better public policy
decisions."' 8 1 Some empirical studies question this assumption.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue "real-life deliberation can fan
emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power
differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated
179. This perspective is often attributed to scholars such as Schumpeter and
Downs, and the debate between this perspective and proponents of deliberation is
addressed in Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical
PoliticalScience, 11 ANN. REv. POL. SCI. 497 (2008).
180, Christin et al., supra note 26; Lupia, supra note 11.
181. John Gastil & James P. Dillard, Increasing Political Sophistication
Through Public Deliberation,16 POL. COMM. 3, 3 (1999).
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with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues
and can lead to worse. decisions than would have occurred if no
deliberation had taken place."' 82 Jackman and Sniderman find
deliberation does not lead to "better grounded judgments-that is,
judgments that reflect one's considered view of the best course of
action all in all." 83 Mendelberg and Oleske's study of town meetings
in New Jersey also offers a pessimistic view.18 4 McCubbins and
Rodriguez present results that demonstrate "experimentally that,
contrary to popular belief, deliberation under realistic conditions
actually decreases social welfare."' 8 5 Instead, they suggest expertise
systems that more closely resemble cue-giving in actual direct
democracy elections.
It is far beyond this Article's scope to adjudicate between these
differing perspectives. What we can offer are observations about the
divergent roles played by different types of cues in direct democracy.
Cues that make encyclopedic information about ballot initiatives more
readily available, as well as the endorsements from citizen panels or
elite bodies that are instructed to ignore their individual interests,
could clearly aid deliberation. By contrast, party and interest group
cues, by activating voters' narrow concerns and making them less
receptive to factual information, appear to work against deliberation.
Yet because they exert such a powerful effect upon voters' choicesand because they often help voters to give individually rational
answers to vastly complicated policy questions-these controversial
cues remain a vital part of direct democracy.

182. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:
AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 191 (James H.
Kuklinski & Dennis Chong eds., 2002).
183. Simon Jackman & Paul M. Sniderman, The Limits of Deliberative
Discussion:A Model ofEveryday PoliticalArguments, 68 J. POL. 272, 272 (2006).
184. See generally Tali Mendelberg & John Oleske, Race and Public
Deliberation,17 POL. COMM. 169 (2000).

185. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 39.
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